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1Abstract
This paper aims at characterizing debt consolidation processes put
forward by some European countries in order to assess welfare and,
in particular, the inequality eﬀects involved. For that we built a gen-
eral equilibrium heterogeneous-agent model capable of exploring the
relationship between ﬁscal policy variables and the endogenous cross-
section distribution of income and wealth.
Results show that, with the exception of the Belgian case, all con-
solidation strategies entail positive welfare gains. The transition costs
aﬀect all episodes and are determinant in sorting among the welfare-
enhancing strategies. Our results conﬁrm the superiority of the ad-
justments based on unproductive expenditures over those based on tax
increases or social transfer reductions. Finally, all strategies involve
lower welfare inequality costs.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E17, E60, H60, I30.
Keywords: ﬁscal consolidation dynamics, European Union, heterogeneous
agent model, inequality, welfare.
21 Introduction
Developed economies, as those belonging to the European Union (EU), have
exhibited a sustained growth of the debt-to-output ratios in the recent past.
This results from governments permanently incurring in ﬁscal deﬁcits. How-
ever, countries have recently made eﬀorts to correct this trajectory by pursu-
ing ﬁscal consolidations. This was the case of the late 1990s, in the awake of
the European and Monetary Union (EMU), and of the recent decade, before
the current crisis.
This paper aims at characterizing debt consolidation processes put for-
ward by some of the EU countries (EU15) in order to assess welfare and,
in particular, the inequality eﬀects involved. For that we built a general
equilibrium heterogeneous-agent model capable of exploring the relationship
between ﬁscal policy variables and the endogenous cross-section distribution
of income and wealth.
We use a dynastic heterogeneous-agent model that includes a continuum
of inﬁnitely-lived rational agents who are hit by idiosyncratic wage shocks
in an incomplete capital market, following seminal works by Bewley (1983),
Imrohoroglu (1989), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1995), among others. The
model, based on Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001), includes
government and the corresponding dynamic budget constraint. Besides in-
cluding taxes levied on labour and capital, we additionally decompose govern-
ment expenditure into transfers to private sector, and productive and unpro-
ductive spending. While productive expenditure is included in the produc-
tion function and, through this channel, increases the global productivity of
the economy, unproductive spending is only utility-augmenting. The model
also includes optimizing ﬁrms endowed with a neoclassical Cobb-Douglas pro-
ductive function and optimizing households that accumulate savings during
“good times” while spending them during “bad times”.
The analysis of a debt consolidation process requires transition between
two steady states. Thus, besides steady-state analysis, transition paths are
crucial for the comparison of welfare eﬀects across debt consolidation strate-
gies. In order to simulate transition paths imposed by a debt consolidation
3strategy we follow the Rios-Rull (1999) and Quadrini et al. (2009) method-
ology. The simulations are conducted under an open economy framework,
assuming the existence of a global market for assets, and hence, a common
interest rate. This international mobility of capital implies that each country
may have either a positive, negative or balanced foreign asset position.
Using the AMECO database for the EU15 countries, we apply the criteria
proposed by Alesina and Perotti (1995) in order to detect the successful debt
consolidation process in each country between 1990 and 2008. Afterwards,
consolidation episodes are identiﬁed as active if a permanent debt reduction
results mainly from the control of the cyclically-adjusted primary deﬁcit.
We further analyze the composition of the cyclically-adjusted primary deﬁcit
in order to detect the main sources for consolidation. Finally, we use our
model to mimic each consolidation process while assessing the welfare and
inequality costs involved.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model,
and deﬁne the social (aggregate) welfare criterion. The successful active con-
solidation strategies are identiﬁed throughout section 3. Simulations and
discussion of the main results is performed in section 4 and section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Model
The model is built from a standard growth model modiﬁed to include a role
for government together with an uninsured idiosyncratic risk and liquidity/
borrowing constraints. We modify the original models of Aiyagari and Mc-
Grattan (1998) and Floden (2001) by breaking the government expenditure
into productive and unproductive. The former is introduced in the utility
function and the latter in the production function. We also use a diﬀerent
approach for the calibration of the idiosyncratic shock.
We set up an international framework composed by two countries or re-
gions, in which capital is assumed to ﬂow freely across borders; labour, in-
stead, is assumed not to ﬂow across countries. In particular, we analyze
consolidation processes for each of the European Union (EU15) countries as-
4suming a domestic block formed by the consolidation country with weight, p,
given by the GDP weight in overall EU15 GDP and a foreign block, consist-
ing of all the others EU15 countries (EU15-1) which acts passively (deﬁned
in this paper as “the rest of the world”). Both regions are identical except
for the size and for the path of the ﬁscal policy instruments. Each country
is composed by three sectors: households, ﬁrms and government.
The model intends to provide an adequate analytical tool to assess welfare
gains from consolidation processes. Moreover, since the model relies on an
heterogeneous-agent framework, it will also be able to produce results in
terms of inequality eﬀects.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents of unit mass who receive after-
tax wage payments, ˜ w, after tax interest from savings, r˜ a, and transfers, tr,
from the government. Following Barro (1973), Floden (2001) and Floden
(2003), we consider that, besides private consumption, ˜ c, and leisure, l, un-
productive government spending, gu, also contributes to households’ utility
at decreasing returns depending on a parameter, ϑ. In each period, agents
are hit by idiosyncratic shocks, et , which determines the productivity level.
Borrowing is allowed only up to a certain limit ˜ b and complete capital mar-
kets is ruled out. This implies that agents have to ensure themselves by
saving during “good times” (˜ at+1 − ˜ at > 0) while, during “bad times”, sav-
ings are negative (˜ at+1 − ˜ at < 0). Each agent is endowed with one unit of
time and solves the double problem of choosing between labor and leisure,
and between consumption and saving.1









1−µ(u1(˜ ct,lt) + ϑu2(gut))|˜ a0,e0

(2.1)
1In order to stabilize the model some variables have to be deﬁned as a percentage of
output (Y ) Namely: ˜ wt = wt
Yt , ˜ ct = ct
Yt, ˜ at = at
Yt, trt = TRt
Yt , gut = Gut
Yt , and ˜ bt = bt
Yt.
5Subject to:
˜ ct + ˜ at+1 = ˜ wt(1 − lt)et + (1 + rt)˜ at + trt , ˜ ct ≥ 0, ˜ at ≥ −˜ b (2.2)




t exp(−(1 − µ)ζ(1 − lt)1+γ)
1 − µ
(2.3)
where µ represents the degree of risk aversion, ζ is constant related to
average labor supply, and 1






The productivity shock, et, is an idiosyncratic shock that evolves stochas-
tically over time according to the following process: the natural logarithm of
et is represented by an AR(1) process with a serial correlation coeﬃcient ρ
and a standard deviation σ:
log(et) = ρlog(et−1) + t (2.5)
2.2 Firms
The ﬁrms are characterized by a neoclassic production function. Output in
each country, Y , is produced using capital, K , labour, N , and productive
government spending, Gp.




Productive government spending is identiﬁed with the share of public
gross investment on output, in line with Barro (1990) and Auschauer (1989),
and enters as an input to private production.2
2In a seminal paper, Barro (1990) incorporates a public sector into a simple, constant
return, model of economic growth. The ratio of real public gross investment to real GDP
is assumed to correspond to a ﬂow of services identiﬁed as the measure of infrastructure
services and enters directly to the production function.
6The parameters α and η represent, respectively, the output elasticities
relative to private capital and to productive government expenditure. The
production function exhibits constant returns to scale over private inputs but
increasing returns over all inputs. Assuming competitive markets of goods
and inputs, private factors are paid according to their marginal productivity
and output is exhaustively distributed. Thus:




rt = (1 − τt)(FK(Kt,Nt,Gpt) − δ) (2.8)
where τ is a proportional income tax rate levied in each country on labour
and capital and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. We must point that the
pre-tax level of interest rate, r, is ﬁxed in the international capital market.
2.3 Government
Each government promotes both productive and unproductive expenditures,
collects taxes and pays lump-sum transfers to households, facing the following
budget constraint in real terms:
gut + gpt + trt + (rt + 1)dt − dt+1 = τt(1 − δkt) (2.9)
where, gpt , kt and dt represent respectively, public gross investment (pro-
ductive expenditure), private capital and government debt as a percentage
of output for each country.
2.4 Asset market equilibrium
Finally, the expression (2.10) represents the international asset market clear-
ing condition when the output-weighed sum of aggregate asset holdings in
each country i, ai, equal the output-weighed sum of private capital demand
plus public debt of both countries (domestic country together with ”the rest













t), i = 1,2. (2.10)
2.5 Solving the model
The analysis of a debt consolidation process requires moving between two
steady states. Transition paths are thus in need to compare the dynamics
of alternative debt consolidation strategies, expenditure or revenue-based,
namely in terms of eventual aggregate transition costs as well as how these
spread across households. In order to simulate transition paths imposed
by a debt consolidation strategy we closely follow Quadrini et al. (2009),
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Rios-Rull (1999) and Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987).
We consider a planner who inherits at time t a predetermined state vector,
including initial debt-to-output ratio, chooses a vector of control or decision
variables for each period within a given horizon in order to reach a new
state vector that includes a previously announced target for the the debt-to-
output ratio at the end of the planning period (Fuente (2000)). We present
the expected life time utility maximization problem in a recursive form, using
the principle of optimality and the Bellman equation as in Quadrini et al.
(2009).
For each country, let {rt, ˜ wt}T
t=0 be a deterministic sequence of prices
(interest rate and wage). Let {dt,gut,gpt,trt}T
t=0 be a sequence of government
policy. The optimal choice for the single agent is to maximise (2.1) subject
to (2.2), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10).
The solution to the agent’s problem of each country delivers all agents de-
cision rules, namely for consumption, ˜ ct(et,˜ at), leisure, lt(et,˜ at), and savings,
˜ at+1(et,˜ at). These decision rules determine the evolution of the distribution
of wealth over e and ˜ a, denoted λt(e,˜ a).
General equilibrium: consider an initial steady state composed by a set
of ﬁscal policy variables {d0,gu0,gp0,tr0}, a vector of equilibrium prices,
8{r0, ˜ w0}, and a stationary distribution, λ0(˜ a,e) for each country.3
The general equilibrium is deﬁned by a sequence, for each country i, of:










t=1; (iii) prices, {rt, ˜ wi
t}∞
t=1 and (iv) distributions {λi
t(˜ at,et)}∞
t=1.
Such that (a) agent decisions solve (2.1); (b) government budget constraint is













t)dλi = Ni, for all {t,i}; and (d) the sequences of λi
t(˜ at,et)∞
t=1
are consistent with the initial steady states, the agent decisions and the id-
iosyncratic shock in each country i.
Transition path: the algorithm for solving the equilibrium transition path
of the economy, given a particular parameterization, typically proceeds in
three stages (Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987)). First we solve for the long-
run initial steady state of the economy (before the implementation of the
ﬁscal consolidation strategy). Second, we solve for the long-run steady state
towards which the economy will eventually converge after full-eﬀects of the
ﬁscal consolidation. Third, we solve for the transition path of the economy
between the two steady states.
In particular, the algorithm for running the third step follows Rios-Rull
(1999) and involves the following steps: (i) choose the sequences for the com-
mon interest rate and for wages in both countries in each period of transition
period rt and ˜ wi
t (i = 1,2); (ii) take the sequences ˜ wi
t(i = 1,2) and rt and
solve backwards the value functions to simulate the whole transition for the
economy, updating the distributions according to agent’s decisions as to ob-
tain sequences for aggregate asset demand and labour supply; (iii) adjust
the sequences in order to clear asset and labour markets for each period of
the transition path; (iv) repeat steps (ii) and (iii) until the three sequences
converge and all markets clear.
3Remember that r0 must be equal for both countries.
92.6 Social welfare computation
The utilitarian social welfare, U, is deﬁned as the solution of (2.1) across all








Since the utility function is concave, the utilitarian social welfare is in-
ﬂuenced by the distribution, and thus, higher inequality or uncertainty will
reduce welfare. Considering a policy change that moves an economy from
equilibrium A to equilibrium B, we deﬁne the welfare gain (wu > 0) or loss





























Preferences: µ is set at 1.5, a value of standard use in the literature. For γ
we follow, among others, Floden (2001) and set it to 2 which is equivalent to a
wage elasticity of labour supply equal to 0.5. The parameter ζ is set in order
to match an average labour supply of around 0.3 (ζ = 9.145). Finally, for
the preferences towards public goods and services relative to private goods,
the baseline calibration sets ϑ = 0.1.5
Technology: the production function is inspired in Barro (1990) to incor-
porate productive government spending. For our baseline model we follow
Auschauer (1989) and set η = 0.3. For the capital share, α = 0.3 (Aiyagari
4The solution is represented by a sequence of consumption and leisure to inﬁnity
{ct,lt}∞
t=0.
5It is not usual to ﬁnd across the literature gu as an argument in the utility function.
Moreover, for the few studies where it is considered there is no homogeneous value for the
calibration. In our model, values larger than ϑ = 0.1 are not compatible with meaningful
values for policy variables observed in EU in most of developed countries.
10and McGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001)).6
Discount factor and interest rate: according to our model, r = α
k − δ.
We set δ = 7.5% as in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and D’Auria et al.
(2010). The variable k represents the capital-to-output ratio and the steady-
state value is calibrated as to match the average value of the capital to output
ratio of the EU15 countries (1990-2008).7 Thus, the steady-state value for
the real interest rate yields 2.8%, in a yearly base which implies β = 0.981.
Government: governments are characterized by a set of ﬁscal indicators
{d,tr,gu,gp}. Using the AMECO database, we calibrate policy variables
as to match each of the consolidation episodes that occurred between 1990
and 2008 in the EU15 countries. Speciﬁc values will be released throughout
section 3.8
Idiosyncratic shock: following the procedure of Tauchen (1986), the id-
iosyncratic shock is replicated as a ﬁrst order Markov chain speciﬁcation with
seven states to match a ﬁrst order autoregressive representation as followed
by, among others, Aiyagari (1994).
Aiyagari (1994), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001) draw
on empirical data for earnings and annual hours worked to set ρ and σ. Due
to unavailable data for the EU15 average, we follow a diﬀerent procedure.
As in Rios-Rull et al. (2003) we set both parameters as to match the existent
inequality in the EU15, as measured by the disposable income Gini index.
According to the AMECO database, the disposable income Gini index varies
between 0.26 and 0.34 during the period 1991-2008. Thus we set ρ = 0.8 and
σ = 0.27 which leads to a disposable income Gini index of around 0.28.
6In a recent paper D’Auria et al. (2010) estimated α = 0.35 for the EU15 over the
period 1960-2003.
7Source: AMECO database, k = 2.9 for the EU15.
8See Table 3.
113 Identiﬁcation of successful consolidation strate-
gies
In order to characterize debt consolidation processes, we proceed following
the approach in the seminal paper by Alesina and Perotti (1995) which iden-
tiﬁes “signiﬁcant ﬁscal impulses” in OECD countries between 1960 and 1992,
in order to study the determinants of “successful” budget consolidation pro-
cesses. In particular, they deﬁne “signiﬁcant” changes in ﬁscal policy stance
using a cyclically adjusted measure of government primary balance and set
several cut-oﬀ points. Moreover, a ﬁscal adjustment in year t is deﬁned as
“successful” if the gross debt/GDP ratio in year t+3 is at least 5 percentage
points lower than in year t.
In our approach, we apply the criteria used by Alesina and Perotti (1995),
but proceed backwards to detect all episodes of “successful” debt consoli-
dation in each of the EU15 countries between 1990 and 2008. We start by
identifying the periods where debt-to-output ratios are, at least, ﬁve percent-
age points below the value observed three years before. Then, we proceed
with identifying the determinants leading to such positive debt dynamics -
primary deﬁcit, snow-ball and stock-ﬂow adjustments (for more details on
the deﬁnitions, see European-Commission (2009)). Consolidation episodes
are identiﬁed as successful if the reduction in the cyclically-adjusted primary
deﬁcit dominates. We further analyze the budget composition in order to
detect the main sources of primary balance adjustment. Finally, we use our
model to mimic each consolidation process while assessing the welfare costs
involved.
From 1990 to 2008, we identify debt reduction episodes in eleven of the
EU15 countries (see shadowed lines in Table 1b). The exceptions are Ger-
many, Greece, France and Luxembourg. As it would be expected, debt con-
trol episodes show signiﬁcant diﬀerences. We can ﬁnd debt control relying
on the expenditure side but, for most of the countries, we ﬁnd mixed strate-
gies including cuts in public spending together with some tax eﬀort. On
the expenditure side, we also distinguish cuts in current spending from cuts
in public investment. Finally, some debt reduction episodes were mainly

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14In order to extract (active) ﬁscal consolidation processes, we decompose
debt dynamics as usual (see, among others, European-Commission (2009)):
Dt = Dt−1.(1 + it) + PDt + SFt (3.1)
Where, D stands for government debt, PD for general government pri-
mary deﬁcit, SF for the stock-ﬂow adjustment and i for nominal interest
rate paid by the government.
























Where Y n is GDP at current market prices and n stands for the correspond-
ing growth rate. The ﬁrst term of the right part in equation 3.2 refers to the
snow-ball eﬀect (SB).
Table 2 shows debt decomposition into primary deﬁcit (including its
cyclically-adjusted component), snow-ball eﬀect (impact on the debt ser-
vice due to the diﬀerence between nominal interest and output growth rates)
and stock-ﬂow adjustments as presented in Equation 3.2. We identify active
ﬁscal consolidations with debt reduction processes that are mainly driven
by cyclically-adjusted primary deﬁcit control. Using this criterion we have
restricted our sample to only nine countries (see shadowed cells in Table 2).
Furthermore, we have identiﬁed for Finland, Netherlands and Sweden two
consolidation processes. Portugal and Italy were excluded as debt reduction
was mainly achieved through stock-ﬂow adjustments and snow-ball eﬀects,
respectively. From Table 2 the primary deﬁcit has been apparently responsi-
ble for a signiﬁcant part of debt reduction in Italy. However, a more careful
examination shows that, during 1995 to 2002, Italy has exhibited constant
and signiﬁcant primary balance surplus. Thus, surpluses have been cancelled
out by the snow-ball eﬀect resulting from an adverse combination of high in-
terest rates and low growth rates (see Figure 1). The true origin of debt
reduction comes from the decreasing snow-ball eﬀect along the whole period,
visible in the red column.
15To characterize the cyclically-adjusted budget deﬁcit composition, we
consider a single instrument on the revenue side, the tax burden, and three
instruments on the expenditure side: ﬁnal consumption, social transfers other
than in kind and gross capital formation, as in European-Commission (2009).
Figures 2 and 3 exhibit, for each consolidation episode, the cyclically-adjusted
evolution of each of the four ﬁscal instruments. Spending was adjusted for
the cyclical component by applying the elasticity of total expenditure (ex-
cluding interest rate) relative to the cycle to all items. Similarly, for the tax
burden, we used the total government revenue elasticity. Elasticities were
calculated from the AMECO Database series).
By analyzing budget decomposition we proceed with classifying ﬁscal
consolidation as a pure expenditure or revenue-based, or a mixed strategy.
Country Debt Reduction P.D.(adj) P.D.(cycle) S.B. S.F.
Austria 5.30 (2004-2007) -3.72 -0.93 -1.01 +0.35
Belgium 50.20 (1993-2007) -63.68 -5.76 +27.73 -8.49
Denmark 53.76 (1993-2007) -59.03 -6.24 +16.42 -4.37
Finland1 14.38 (1995-2001) -24.15 -6.41 +1.77 +14.38
Finland2 11.01 (2003-2008) -18.41 -7.58 -2.31 +17.29
Ireland 69.63 (1991-2006) -51.91 -4.73 -36.82 +23.82
Italy 17.74 (1995-2004) -34.95 +2.40 +18.16 -1.51
Netherlands1 25.21 (1994-2002) -23.22 -2.90 +4.34 -3.43
Netherlands2 6.81 (2004-2007) -6.98 -0.47 -0.35 +0.98
Portugal 10.68 (1995-2000) +1.66 -2.71 -1.46 -8.17
Spain 30.58 (1996-2007) -21.43 -3.87 -11.17 +5.89
Sweden1 19.48 (1996-2002) -28.09 +0.14 +6.02 +2.45
Sweden2 14.25 (2003-2008) -11.19 -9.06 -2.48 +8.48
UK 13.51 (1996-2002) -14.09 -3.60 +2.82 +1.35
Table 2: Contributions to the debt reduction.
P.D.(adj)=Cyclically-adjusted primary deﬁcit, P.D.(cycle)=Cyclical compo-
nent of primary deﬁcit, S.B.=Snow-ball eﬀect, S.F.=Stock-ﬂow adjustment.










1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Primary Deficit Snow-ball effect
Stock-flow adjustment
Figure 1: (3-year) Contribution to debt reduction - Italy.
Source: European-Commission (2009) and AMECO database.
The twelve successful consolidation episodes are characterized in detail
in Table 3. We identify four pure strategies: one revenue-based (Belgium),
two expenditure-based relying on social transfers (Austria and Netherlands
1994-2002) and an expenditure-based strategy combining transfer and ﬁ-
nal consumption reductions in Finland (1995-2001). The remaining eight
episodes are characterized by mixed strategies. Five of them are based on
taxes and social transfers (Denmark, Finland 2003-2008, Netherlands 2004-
2007, Sweden 2003-2008 and UK), one is based on taxes, social transfers and
unproductive expenditures (Sweden 1996-2002) and the last two (Spain and
Ireland) are mixed strategies relying on taxes and a reallocation of social




























































































































Tax Burden Final Cons. Social Transf. Gross Inv.
(f) Ireland
Figure 2: Budget decomposition - tax burden and ﬁnal consumption (left















































































































Tax Burden Final Cons. Social Transf. Gross Inv.
(e) Sweden2





















Tax Burden Final Cons. Social Transf. Gross Inv.
(f) UK
Figure 3: Cyclically-adjusted primary deﬁcit components (% of GDP) - tax
burden and ﬁnal consumption (left-hand scale); social transfer other than in
kind and gross ﬁxed capital formation (right-hand scale).






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































204 Simulation and assessment of welfare gains
After having identiﬁed twelve consolidation episodes that were mainly driven
by the control of the cyclically-adjusted primary deﬁcit, we proceed with
the simulations using the model presented in section 2. Debt and ﬁscal
instruments are adjusted to match each consolidation process.9 As for the
“rest of the world” block, we use the average values for each ﬁscal variables of
the EU15-1 countries for the same period. Tax rate is, as before, endogenous,
adjusting to satisfy the government budget constraint.
The dynamics of the macroeconomic and inequality variables depend on
the instruments used in the ﬁscal adjustment. However, all processes exhibit
some common features. The initial phase is characterized by a temporary
recession due to the increase in the interest rate. Disposable income falls
and both wealth and disposable Gini indexes increase. In the second phase,
the economy evolves towards its ﬁnal steady state: interest and tax rates
decrease, converging to a lower level in relation to the initial steady state;
disposable income and asset holdings converge to higher than initial levels.
Wealth and disposable Gini indexes decrease gradually to ﬁnal lower, steady
state levels (see Table 6). Thus, after an increase in inequality during tran-
sition, ﬁscal consolidation entails improvements in the distribution of wealth
and income. As an example of the dynamic process explained above, Fig-
ure 4 exhibits the transition dynamics for the second Swedish consolidation
episode (2003-2008).
Table 4 summarizes for each country the period of debt consolidation,
debt reduction eﬀort, debt consolidation strategy, overall welfare gain (tran-
sition plus steady state), the magnitude of transition costs as a percentage of
ﬁnal relative to initial steady-state welfare gain, the Welfare Gain Intensity
(WGI) and the Total Spending Cut (TSC). Information in Table 4 is sorted
by the WGI in a decreasing order. The WGI is an indicator built in order to
compare debt consolidation welfare gains across countries when consolidation
eﬀorts are of diﬀerent magnitudes. In particular, WGI equals the welfare gain
9For each simulation we calibrate our model according to section 2.7 and using the
values presented in Table 3 for debt and ﬁscal instruments
21per percentage point of debt reduction. TSC refers to the combined reduc-




































































Disp. Income Gini     
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 4: Dynamics of macroeconomic variables during ﬁscal consolidation
in Sweden (2003-2008) - Sweden (solid line) versus EU15-1 (dashed line).
Note: All variables are expressed in percentage variation.
In spite of overall positive welfare gains, all consolidations strategies in-
volve positive welfare transition costs. The most successful strategies appear
to present lower transition costs. Transition costs, in turn, also seem to be
positively associated with tax eﬀort. Higher tax peaks depress strongly the
disposable income which, in turn, decreases the asset demand, increasing in-
terest rate and thus prolonging the recession. In Belgium, the only country
22following a pure tax-based strategy, debt consolidation exhibited the highest
transition cost, thus implying the lowest (almost null) welfare gains. The
results on WGI show that: (1) debt-reduction processes that involved reduc-
tion in unproductive spending were clearly welfare superior (Finland 1995-
2001, Ireland, 1991-2006, and Sweden 2003-2008) and, among these, welfare
is further enhanced (2) the lower the tax eﬀort (Finland) and (3) the more
public expenditure is biased towards investment (Ireland). Another stylized
feature is that, with the exception of the Irish and the Spanish processes,
the higher TSC the more welfare enhanced consolidation strategies were.
The cases of Ireland (1991-2006) and Spain (1996-2007) show that, when a
successful consolidation involves shifting towards productive expenditure, it
requires smaller unproductive spending and social transfer cuts. Moreover,
as productive expenditures have no eﬀect on inequality, since its eﬀects are
homogeneous across the economy, these strategies involve lower inequality
costs during the initial consolidation periods.
The impacts on the EU15-1 from each country consolidation are rather
small, although positive in all cases, except for the Belgian, the Spanish and
the Irish consolidation processes. The higher positive impacts on the EU15-
1 were produced by the consolidation eﬀorts of the larger countries, namely
the UK. Table 5 sorts the EU15 by size (as measured by GDP weight in



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24The positive spillover eﬀects are mainly explained by the costless welfare
gains obtained by the passive country that beneﬁts from the interest rate de-
crease and by the capital ﬂowing out of the consolidating country. However,
in the Belgium tax-based case, the interest rate increased signiﬁcantly during
transition; the severe recession also aﬀected the EU15-1 countries, canceling
out the beneﬁt of the lower level of the ﬁnal steady state interest rate. The
Irish and Spanish cases are also peculiar as they involved a huge ﬂow of as-
sets from the EU15-1 countries to the domestic economy, which explains the
negative spillover eﬀects.
Country Weight EU15-1 global welfare gain
United Kingdom 0.1391 0.0014
Spain 0.0787 -0.0006
Netherlands 1 0.0479 0.0009
Netherlands 2 0.0479 0.0002
Belgium 0.0294 -0.0000
Sweden1 0.0293 0.0003
Sweden 2 0.0293 0.0002
Austria 0.0242 0.0001
Denmark 0.0198 0.0002
Finland 1 0.0150 0.0003
Finland 2 0.0150 0.0000
Ireland 0.0122 -0.0003
Table 5: Welfare eﬀects from domestic consolidations on the EU15-1.
Figures 5 and 6 show for each consolidation episode the welfare gain curve
(solid line) across wealth (asset holdings); it also shows the initial distribu-
tion of wealth (dashed line). Viegas and Ribeiro (2011) have shown that the
welfare distribution moves negatively with debt and positively with transfer
and unproductive expenditures while productive expenditures are neutral.
Decreasing social transfers as well as unproductive expenditures leads to a
worse welfare distribution. Diﬀerently, debt reduction should improve the
25welfare distribution. Apparently, in terms of welfare inequality, transfer and
unproductive spending eﬀects have dominated over the debt eﬀect during
the European consolidation processes: despite debt reduction, welfare in-
equality across wealth increased, although not very signiﬁcantly. Through
all consolidation processes (except for the Irish case) the welfare gain curve
across wealth is positively sloped. However, with the exception of Denmark,
Finland (1995-2001) and Netherlands (1994-2002), welfare gain curves are
almost horizontal (see Figures 5 and 6).
Results not reported show that all inequality measures (wealth and in-
come) present similar paths to the ones shown in Figure 4.10 They ﬁrst rise
sharply during the debt reduction period, decreasing smoothly afterwards.
Wealth and disposable income Gini index end at a lower level relative to the
initial steady sate level (see Table 6) due, essentially, to capital ﬂows across
borders. The consolidation process leads to an excess of asset demand in
the domestic country supplied with foreign assets, bought, essentially by the
lower-wealth classes to whom marginal propensity to save is higher. Thus,
the disposable income Gini index follows.
Table 7 shows the eﬀective disposable income Gini coeﬃcients observed
during the identiﬁed consolidation periods. In eight out of the twelve con-
solidation processes, the disposable income Gini index increased during the
debt-reduction period (Denmark, Finland 1997-2001, Finland 2003-2008, Ire-
land, Netherlands 2005-2007, Spain, Sweden 1996-2002 and UK) supporting
the prediction of our model. Although income distribution depends on the
dynamics of multiple variables, some of which are missing from our model,
actual evolution of Gini coeﬃcients may be, at least partially, induced by
the debt consolidation processes. The long run tendency towards the new
(lower) steady state value is, obviously, much more diﬃcult to observe.
10This regularity is common to all Gini indexes across all the other consolidation pro-
cesses.
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Figure 5: Welfare gains across wealth following debt consolidations.
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Figure 6: Welfare gains across wealth following debt consolidations (contin-
uation).
28Initial S. State Final S. State
Country WG IG WG IG
Austria 0.3804 0.3657 0.3708 0.3577
Belgium 0.3812 0.3657 0.3782 0.3634
Denmark 0.4170 0.3943 0.3844 0.3681
Finland 1 0.4320 0.4063 0.3725 0.3587
Finland 2 0.3874 0.3709 0.3749 0.3606
Ireland 0.3019 0.2959 0.1226 0.1223
Netherlands 1 0.3925 0.3748 0.3545 0.3433
Netherlands 2 0.3643 0.3514 0.3572 0.3454
Spain 0.3384 0.3297 0.3206 0.3134
Sweden1 0.4332 0.4065 0.4093 0.3879
Sweden 2 0.4243 0.3995 0.3992 0.3798
United Kingdom 0.3588 0.3474 0.3487 0.3386
Table 6: Debt consolidation eﬀects on inequality.
Notes: WG = Wealth Gini index; IG = Income Gini index.
Country 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 0,24 0,25 0,24 0,26 0,25 0,24 0,27 0,26 0,26 0,25 0,26 0,26
Belgium 0,29 0,27 0,27 0,29 0,29 0,28 0,28 0,26 0,28 0,28 0,26 0,28
Denmark 0,23 0,21 0,20 0,21 0,23 0,22 0,25 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,25 0,25
Finland 0,23 0,22 0,22 0,24 0,26 0,27 0,26 0,26 0,25 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,26
Ireland 0,32 0,33 0,34 0,32 0,30 0,29 0,31 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,31 0,30
Netherlands 0,28 0,28 0,26 0,25 0,26 0,28 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,26 0,28 0,28
Spain 0,34 0,34 0,35 0,34 0,33 0,34 0,33 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,32 0,31 0,31 0,31
Sweden 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,24 0,24 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,24 0,23 0,24
United Kingdom 0,37 0,35 0,30 0,32 0,32 0,37 0,35 0,35 0,34 0,34 0,32 0,33 0,34
Table 7: Eﬀective disposable income Gini coeﬃcient during consolidation
processes (grey cells). Source: OECD.Stat; blank cells correspond to years
for which no data is available.
Because capital ﬂows freely across borders, the ﬁnancial account depends
on the international level of interest rate relative its autarky level.11 If the
equilibrium interest rate on the international markets exceeds the autarky
level, there is an excess of asset demand in the domestic country and residents
11The one that would prevail in the domestic country in a closed economy simulation.
29will buy foreign assets. Capital ﬂows outwards and the domestic country ends
with a positive net foreign asset position. Conversely, if the equilibrium in-
terest rate is set below the autarky level, the domestic asset supply surpasses
asset demand and the excess of domestic assets will be acquired by foreign
households. Capital ﬂows inwards and the domestic country ends up with a
negative net foreign asset position.
During the consolidation processes, two adjustments occur in the capital
market, as illustrated in Figure 7. First, the asset supply (government plus
private sector) curve moves to the left as the government reduces public debt.
Second, the asset demand curve moves to the right because of the income
eﬀect. Thus, there is an excess demand for assets and the net foreign asset
(NFA) position improves. Results not reported show that, only in four cases
(Belgium, Ireland, Spain and UK),12 and temporarily for the ﬁrst years of
transition, the asset demand curve retreat dominates over the shift in the
asset supply curve, depressing the NFA position.
Table 8 presents the short run components of the NFA as measured by
portfolio investments plus other investments (which includes debt invest-
ments such as loans, deposits and trade credits) during the twelve consolida-
tion processes. As we have mentioned before, relative to actual Gini indexes,
capital ﬂows depend on many other factors which the model fails to capture.
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Figure 7: International asset market.
12Precisely those countries exhibiting higher ﬁscal eﬀorts.
30As it can be seen from the table, during the twelve active consolidation
processes, the NFA position improves in nine out of the twelve cases (Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands 1994-2002, Netherlands 2004-2007,
Sweden 1996-2002, Sweden 2003-2002 and UK). In the remaining consolida-
tion processes (Finland 1995-2001, Finland 2003-2008 and Spain), there is a
reduction in the NFA position during the consolidation period. In particular,
during the Spanish consolidation process the NFA position improves during
the ﬁrst seven years while it decreases during the ﬁnal adjustment periods.13
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Austria 0,27 0,23 0,18 0,16 0,17 0,14 0,15 0,15 0,13 0,22 0,30 0,27 0,29 0,36 0,41 0,46 0,63 0,69
Belgium 1,38 1,36 1,25 1,35 1,43 1,41 1,46 1,60 1,78 1,90 1,87 1,91 2,03 2,22 2,38 2,44 2,75 3,01
Denmark nd 0,14 0,07 0,01 0,05 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,10 0,22 0,31 0,21 0,20 0,33 0,36 0,42 0,57 0,69
Finland -0,08 -0,12 -0,17 -0,32 -0,41 -0,29 -0,28 -0,29 -0,65 -1,54 -1,38 -0,64 -0,27 -0,15 0,06 0,01 0,13 0,01
Ireland nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 1,70 2,63 3,27 3,21 3,24 3,54 3,77 3,55 3,25 4,06 4,59
Netherlands 0,62 0,62 0,52 0,52 0,26 0,25 0,21 0,23 0,29 0,51 0,56 0,74 0,81 0,94 1,07 0,85 1,06 1,55
Spain 0,05 0,03 0,07 0,09 0,13 0,14 0,11 0,12 0,17 0,12 0,17 0,15 0,18 0,19 0,09 0,05 -0,11 -0,20
Sweden 0,23 0,20 0,18 0,11 0,12 0,16 0,15 -0,29 -0,23 -0,20 -0,09 0,02 0,07 0,13 0,18 0,18 0,36 0,55
United Kingdom 1,07 1,02 0,99 1,28 1,20 1,21 1,28 1,38 1,28 1,08 1,23 1,43 1,46 1,60 1,74 1,97 2,21 2,52
Table 8: Portfolio investment plus other investments (source: Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2006)).
5 Conclusion
We use a model to simulate the twelve active consolidation episodes that
have occurred in European Union between 1990 and 2008 (one pure revenue-
based, three pure expenditure-based and eight mixed strategies). In order
to compare debt consolidation welfare gains across countries in which con-
solidation eﬀorts were of diﬀerent magnitudes, we compute a welfare gain
intensity measure (WGI) - welfare gain per percentage point of debt reduc-
tion -, and the total spending cuts (TSC) - combined reduction in social
transfers and unproductive expenditures involved per each percentage point
of debt reduction.
Results show that, with the exception of the Belgian case, all consolida-
tion strategies entail positive welfare gains. The transition costs aﬀect all
episodes and are determinant to the rank of the consolidation strategies in
13Results are similar even if we consider NFA as a whole (i.e. including foreign direct
investment, ﬁnancial derivatives and reserve assets).
31terms of welfare gains. Our results conﬁrm the superiority of the adjust-
ments based on the reduction of unproductive expenditures over those based
on tax increases or on social transfer reductions. As for the mixed strate-
gies, welfare is further enhanced the lower the tax eﬀort and the higher the
spending cuts are. Also, switching unproductive for productive expenditure
results in signiﬁcant welfare improvements (Ireland and Spain). Finally, all
strategies involve lower welfare inequality costs. As for the wealth and in-
come inequality in particular, the outcomes of the model replicate the data
for the corresponding Gini index paths: namely, an initial hump-shaped dy-
namic towards a more compressed distribution. This improvement on both
asset and disposable income distributions is closely related to the changes
in the net foreign asset position produced by consolidation episodes in an
open-economy framework. For the latter, model results are also supported
by the data.
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